1 What were they thinking? Insider trading and the scienter requirement Donald C. Langevoort On its face, the connection between insider trading regulation and the state of mind of the trader or tipper seems fairly intuitive. Insider trading is a form of market abuse: taking advantage of a material, non-public secret to which one is not entitled, generally in breach of some kind of fiduciary-like duty. It is an exploitation of status or access, typically coupled with some form of faithlessness. Certainly the extraordinary public attention that insider trading enforcement and prosecutions command reflects the idea that the essence of unlawful insider trading is cheating.
These prosecutions are main-stage morality plays, with greed as the story line.
1 The SEC in particular seems to sense that it garners public political support by casting itself in the role of tormentor of the greedy.
If this is right
, then what the legal system should be looking to proscribe is deliberate exploitation-trading on the basis of information in order to gain an unfair, unlawful advantage over others in the marketplace. That involves a fairly tight causal connection between knowledge of the information and the decision to buy or sell.
This Chapter will examine both the law and the psychology associated with this pursuit.
The USA law of insider trading is actually much more conflicted and confusing as to the necessary state of mind for either trading or tipping. 2 Mostly, this is a product of conceptual confusion in how we define unlawful insider trading-the quixotic effort to build a coherent theory of insider trading by reference to the law of fraud, rather than a more expansive market abuse standard. It is familiar enough that the courts (at the SEC's urging) have taken dominion of the law of insider trading by deeming it a species of fraud. That is intellectually awkward because there is relatively little about unlawful insider trading that can fairly be considered
deceptive, yet deception is the essence of fraud. The result is a crazy-quilt of made-up doctrinal innovations to declare abusive trading fraudulent, either vis-à-vis other marketplace traders (the affirmative duty to disclose when there is a pre-existing duty of trust) or the source of the information (misappropriation by feigning loyalty to the entrustor). Another layer of complication ensues when the subject of the prosecution didn't trade but instead gave the information to someone else, so that we have to ask why this communication occurred. Given this patchwork, it actually becomes very difficult to describe the legally required state of mind for insider trading prosecutions. 4 the recklessness must have a subjective dimension to it, something akin to conscious or deliberate avoidance of the truth.
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Mapping this onto the law of insider trading has been difficult. As noted at the outset of this Chapter, the intuitive characterization with respect to trading (putting aside tipping for the moment) is that scienter means that the insider must have deliberately taken advantage of-that is, used-the information for personal gain. Use implies a causal connection between the information and the trade, which if broken negates the intentionality of the allegedly bad act. By and large, the case law invokes the use locution, often referring to the essence of insider trading intentionality as trading "on the basis of" the information in question.
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Hence it is not surprising that cases have arisen where the defendant concedes (at least arguendo) that he came into possession of information that can be characterized as both material and nonpublic but that this was not the reason that he bought or sold. Rather, there was an entirely independent causal explanation for the trade, i.e., that he would have traded anyway, at the same time and in the same amount, even without access to the information. Perhaps the best known example of this in the case law is a director-defendant who sold a sizable amount of his company's stock after receiving disappointing news about the company's financial condition during a board meeting. 7 His defense was that he had already made plans to sell that stock in Following from the intuition that insider trading is about the misuse of information, the court agreed that such a defense can properly be raised. To be sure, the court was extremely skeptical of the defense as a factual matter, and so held that a presumption of misuse was warranted that the defendant would then have the burden of rebutting. Some other cases, particularly criminal prosecutions, have articulated the same causation standard without any such presumption, thus apparently allocating to the prosecution the burden of proving causation.
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That gets us into the mind of the alleged insider trader, which is inevitably very difficult.
Some of the practical burden, however, is ameliorated by the fact that this form of subjective intent can be proven circumstantially-fact-finders are entitled to draw inferences about causation from the surrounding facts. As we shall see later on, this introduces a great deal of creative freedom for judges or juries to tell a story of their own making in characterizing the defendant's state of mind. So, we shouldn't overstate any burden that this way of reading the law puts on prosecutors or the SEC, so long as they can persuade the fact-finder of the defendant's greedy character or disposition. So this is one place in the law where we seek to inquire into the "why" behind the choice to buy or sell when there is an allegation of insider trading. There are other places, however.
One-which has not received as much judicial or academic commentary as it should-has to do with what we mean by awareness when there are doubts about either the materiality or public dissemination is necessary before information becomes public, while other suggest that enough leakage will suffice.
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The final place where state of mind questions become challenging is in the law of tipping.
The Supreme Court has allowed insider trading cases to go forward against an insider who does not trade but instead passes on the information to someone else. 19 But to restrain liability for otherwise legitimate communications, the Court-at least for classical insider trading casesinsisted on proof that the insider was breaching a fiduciary duty for personal benefit by passing on the information, and that the recipient knew or had reason to know of the self-serving breach.
That once again takes us inside the mind of the insider, this time to check for selfish motivation.
This is made partly easier by the extraordinarily capacious definition of personal benefit offered by the Court. The requisite personal benefit need not be pecuniary (e.g, a kick-back from the recipient), but can consist of a reputational gain or even the warm glow from making a gift of the information to a family member or friend. We have to check the mind of the recipient as well, to see if there was enough awareness or suspicion that selfishness was at work in motivating the insider's tip. Many cases offer particularly vexing problems here, especially when there is a chain of tippers and tippees-the situation where the insider tells a friend, who tells some other acquaintances, and so on.
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As with the other state of mind subjects we have surveyed, there is some doctrinal inconsistency here, too. Insider trading cases take one of two basic forms, classical or 18 See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 5:4.
19 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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"misappropriation." The test just described clearly applies in classical cases, but not necessarily when the allegation is that the insider-tipper defrauded the source of the information by giving it to someone else. While most of the time the selfish (broadly defined) motivation for the tip is obvious enough, the SEC and a few courts have said that it is not essential as part of the prosecution. 21 The point seems to be that it is possible to have a purely reckless tip, where the tipper supposedly misappropriates by passing on the information to someone who trades not to facilitate that trading but with indifference to the likelihood that that would happen.
What characterizes each of these doctrinal questions is the necessity for the fact-finder to enter the mind of the accused insider trader or tipper to draw some kind of inference about causation and/or motivation. As we shall see in the next part of this Chapter, that is laden with difficulty. Separately, note the doctrinal confusion in and of itself-often it is impossible to say with any degree of confidence whether a particular instance of trading is lawful or not. That indeterminacy has its own psychological consequences, as we shall also see.
II. Explaining insider trading
The aim of this second part is to offer a taxonomy of "state of mind" explanations for allegedly illegal insider trading, beyond the one possibility already discussed (trading for a reason other than the inside information). This is meant solely as a descriptive exercise; later on, the conclusion will try to link this back to the various legal muddles. Here we will be content to grapple with the "what were they thinking" question.
12
A. Rational choice: Risks and benefits
The first explanation is the simplest, and probably the most robust. Along the lines of the orthodox approach to the economics of criminality, we can simply say that to the person faced with an opportunity for insider trading, the benefits in terms of gains exceed the risk. Famously, James O'Hagan, the subject of the Supreme Court's misappropriation theory decision, was apparently motivated by the need to avoid detection of his own embezzlement of client funds from the law firm's accounts, which he was going to replace with the proceeds of the insider trading. 22 The benefits, presumably, are mainly monetary, though we could easily add other forms of utility such as thrill-seeking satisfaction, status enhancement, ego gratification, and the like.
The risks are impossible to assess with rigor. One can predict that if caught, the SEC will seek monetary recovery in the order of three times the gains from the trading, 23 which would set up a fairly concrete decision structure. But there is also a real risk of criminal prosecution, with significant jail time upon conviction. In addition, there is ample collateral damage even from simple civil enforcement, including attorneys' fees that may not be covered by indemnification or insurance, career loss and other reputational sanctions, and so forth. Even more difficult to assess is the risk of detection. It seems to be common wisdom that the risk of detection is quite 
B. Risk mis-estimation
Because the risk estimation associated with an insider trading decision is so speculative, it is hard to assess its rationality. Later on, we will come back to how emotional impulses and other cognitive factors might bias this estimation. But before getting there, we should probably consider the possibility that people systematically underestimate the risk of detection, even if the risk is relatively low. In other words, do they perceive the risk to be even lower than it really is?
We can only speculate. The SEC and prosecutors bring publicity to bear on their cases in an effort to make it seem like detection is commonplace, and we cannot rule out that this campaign works to inflate the perception of likelihood of detection. On the other hand, it is likely that insider trading opportunities arise in settings (like M&A work at an investment banking firm or law firm) where there are direct or indirect observations of likely illegal trading, which if not detected by the authorities will probably bias the judgment as to likelihood downward (as well as increase the ego and status pressures to conform). In this sense, insider trading is likely to be viral, and if the probability of detection is indeed low as a statistical matter, the perception that people are getting away with it will seem especially high until an enforcement action hits close to home.
In any event, public knowledge of how insider traders are caught is relatively sparse (though maybe not in elite social and economic circles We have already seen some of the issues on which courts still have not agreed: the possession versus use disagreement, the precise meaning of "nonpublic," and the role of personal benefit in misappropriation cases, for example. The law of insider trading has evolved in a common law style, so that even a well-trained lawyer could not always give a confident answer as to what the prevailing legal standard is.
But that problem is dwarfed by the relative indeterminacy of so many of the legal standards that are well established. The most obvious example is materiality, a subject that Joan
Heminway has explored in some depth. 32 Materiality refers to likely importance; in insider trading, it is a proxy for that which is important enough that a reasonable person would expect the market price to move upon discovery of the information, thereby creating a pre-discovery profit opportunity to exploit. To the insider or tipper, of course, that is only a prediction: the market reaction is observed only after the allegedly unlawful activity. Much of the time, the information in the insider's possession only suggests that there might be a significant event,
without one yet having ripened into concrete reality. This is material if, looking jointly at the probability of occurrence and the magnitude of the impact, the expected value of the event is significant enough. 33 By all accounts, these are hard calculations to make prior to the event (and as discussed below, are subject to a very different perspective when judged in hindsight).
Quite possibly, some insiders have no sound intuition of this, but rather assume that insider trading is about risk-free profits, which assumes something akin to certainty embedded in the secret. Even if not, insiders will often confront factual ambiguity that is not easy to assess. A fairly recent SEC enforcement action targeted mid-level managers at a railway company that was being sold. They were not privy to information about the sale, but gleaned the possibility from a variety of facts, including well-dressed people inspecting railway assets, unusual assignments to 
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provide lists of such assets, and the like. The district court let the case go forward on materiality, while expressing some discomfort as to the softness of the "facts" in defendants' possession.
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There are many other areas where similarly difficult or counter-intuitive issues lurk.
When information is sufficiently "out there" to be public is hard to assess-quite a number of insiders have been the subject of enforcement proceedings even though information about the event was already in the newspapers at the time of their trading, because the SEC contends that what they knew was more certain that what the media was reporting. 35 The issue of duty is also murky. How many people not deeply familiar with the law in this area would realize that it is permissible to trade on most kinds of information that your overhear some executives talking at a restaurant, but that it is not lawful to trade on similar information heard coming from an executive at, say, an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting?
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Without at this point passing judgment on insiders' excuses as to ignorance of the law, the murkiness of the inferences necessary to determine legality or not connects back to our discussion of perceptions of legitimacy as strong indicators of behavior when likelihood of detection is low. Where there are competing factual inferences-i.e., the trader can say that he is simply being smart, not cheating-the ability to construe the trading opportunity as legitimate goes up.
34 See SEC v. Steffes, 2012 WL 3418305 (N. D. Ill. 2012 .
35 See SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1997 
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enough how desire will also influence the perception of legitimacy. What is fair is very much in the mind of the beholder, and can represent little more than the rationalization of wants.
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But it is the indeterminacy of the law, and factual inferences relating thereto, where particularly powerful greasing can take place. The mind will try to find ways to construe the situation so as to invoke real or imagined excuses and safe harbors. A director learning bad news about his or her company may come to think that a decision to sell was actually made some time ago based on other circumstances, but just delayed-the inside information is not really being "used." Uncertainty might be inflated to diminish the perception of materiality; imagining that others must know (and be acting) on the information will blunt the inference of non-publicness.
These are just inferences from the psychological research, of course. We cannot study the mind of the insider trader directly. 42 But we have some anecdotal glimpses to draw from, the most celebrated of which is the story of Martha Stewart's troubles stemming from her sales of stock in ImClone in December 2001. Stewart was a friend an acquaintance of the founder of ImClone, and they shared the same stockbroker (Bacanovic) at Merrill Lynch. They all knew that
ImClone was soon about to receive a highly significant ruling from the FDA about an important drug under development. On December 27, she received a call from Baconovic's assistant while on a holiday flight, telling her essentially that ImClone was trading down and the Waksal's were selling their stock. She immediately told the broker's assistant to sell her stock as well, and just avoided a loss of approximately $45,000 from so doing.
On its face, this was at least a reckless decision. Stewart sold the stock in a highly visible account at a well-known broker-dealer as a result of information at least closely connected to the top levels of management at ImClone. She was reasonably familiar with the prohibition against insider trading, though perhaps not all its nuances. Even conceding some difficult legal issues as to whether she could take advantage of this information or not, the risk should have been What was most notable is how reluctant she was to sell her stocks, which may connect to a tendency often noted in the behavioral finance literature. Stewart was regularly favored with IPO allocations, meaning that she was able to buy the stocks at a deep discount to likely nearterm market values. Whether or not they "flip" immediately, many investors take their profit in the near-term. Stewart did not, holding the shares through expectedly dramatic price increases and then, later on, through the bursting of the tech stock bubble. She thus managed to lose money even having started in such an extraordinarily favorable position.
Whose fault this was is not clear; Stewart apparently blamed Bacanovic and Merrill. In any event, Bacanovic met with Stewart in mid-December to urge her sell her "loss" stocks before the end of the year to offset against taxable income. They discussed each of the holdings, including ImClone, and Stewart finally sold off all twenty-two of her loss stocks on December 21 and 24 for a combined loss of $1,037,874. Because ImClone was one of her few profitable stocks (and by far her most profitable), she held onto it. She had bought ImClone at $16, and as of mid-December had a gain of some $186,000. Crucially, Stewart said that this selling "made her stomach turn," an interesting psychological point. In fact, the tax losses were quite valuable given Stewart's other income. However, having to finally admit defeat and take the losses- Initially, there were two bits of information in the phone message-that the Waksals were selling and that Bacanovic expected the price to decline. She called the broker's assistant and learned one more fact-that the price had already fallen a good bit. My suspicion is that (especially in an angry and emotional state) she could easily construe this to mean that adverse information had already reached the market, and the big institutions were starting to bail out. She did not want to be left behind, again.
As to the Waksals' selling, I suspect that she construed this as the Waksals and much of Wall Street. In fact, it is hard to imagine (especially to a former stockbroker) that she would assume that she was being told that the Waksals were selling illegally-which would be the case if the information had not yet made it to the market. Illegal sales by senior executives do not usually occur in an unconcealed fashion through a reputable broker. Again, the more likely 44 See Statman, supra note 43.
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inference is that word about Erbitux had become public and that the Waksals were joining the crowd.
Whether this is a successful defense as a matter of law is a bit murky. As Rule 10b5-1 shows, the SEC prefers a simplified state of mind inquiry, and could claim that even if the foregoing were true (1) Stewart still had one piece of information that the rest of the world did not, received from a private source in arguable breach of fiduciary duty; (2) under these circumstances, she recklessly failed to ascertain the state of public knowledge before selling; and (3) that information does not become public until it is fully internalized by the market (i.e., trading by the smart money is not enough if the price is still adjusting).
But I doubt that under the emotional pressure prompting so many psychologically potent forces-loss aversion, regret, and stomach-turning shame-she would have construed the situation with such acuity. Her mind wanted to sell that stock, and the construal gave her permission to do so. Others were selling, so she could, too. Bad judgment, perhaps, but not all that surprising psychologically. Like so many bad judgments by those with high ego and selfesteem, it generated a poorly-executed cover-up, which is what actually landed Martha Stewart in jail.
III. Connecting the explanations and the law
Our remaining task in this Chapter is to connect these explanations to the legal conundrums discussed in the first part. Obviously, when insider trading is a deliberate choice to assume the risk of detection because of the expected utility in terms of money, thrill, ego or whatever, the explanations add little. The penalty structure of USA insider trading law is built on the implicit assumption that these cases are about greed, and can be deterred by getting the right mix of sanctions and detection resources. We might not have the optimal mix, but it would not be because we misunderstand what is happening. If anything, stopping here underscores the idea that "misuse" of inside information is what we are trying to reach, so that courts that prefer that formulation of the law have it right.
That there might well be individual or cultural legitimation of insider trading at work when someone chooses this same risk might alter the characterization of what is going on-there is a rejection rather than an appreciation of wrongdoing-but that is not a particularly troubling legal issue, either. Similarly, misconstrual of the law generally is met with the response that ignorance is no excuse. It does get harder, however, when misconstruals go to facts (like materiality or non-publicness) rather than law (duty). Scienter does suggest that there must be some contemporaneous appreciation of both significance and secrecy to which eyes are being shut. As suggested in our discussion of the Martha Stewart case, I think there was a plausible argument that she thought-too hastily, perhaps, but without conscious doubt-that word of the FDA action had become public knowledge at least within sophisticated trading markets, which could be a defense to liability. Here the stress turns to recklessness, and the difficulties in drawing the line between deliberate indifference to a known risk and conduct that, in hindsight at least, is hard to explain. That said, if insider trading law is meant to address deliberate exploitation of entrusted information, extending liability too far in the direction of recklessness is unnecessary to carry out the law's expressive function. However, we shouldn't obsess too much on all this. All these scienter labels are attached by judges and jurors acting outside the mind of the defendant, in hindsight. 47 The uncertainties and ambiguities that might have clouded the mind of the defendant at the time will not be at work in their own minds as they pass judgment. The certainty of the money made by the defendant will be particularly salient, and the tendency to explain behavior in terms of individual 46 See U. S. v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993 
